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FRAND AND ANTITRUST 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
I.  Introduction 
Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) create technology 
standards in order to ensure product or service quality, promote 
compatibility and interoperability of networked products, and 
facilitate the competitive development of new technologies.1 
Standard-setting in patent rich environments often requires 
participants to disclose relevant patents that they own, and license 
patents essential to the standard to all participants on fair, reasonable, 
and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms.  While governments can be 
heavily involved in standard setting,2 the implementation of technical 
standards in information technologies is largely the work of private 
actors.  Government involvement is limited mainly to enforcement of 
contract, intellectual property, or antitrust law. 
 
  This paper addresses one question: when is a patentee’s 
violation of a FRAND commitment an antitrust violation, and if so, of 
what kind and what are the implications for remedies? It warns against 
two extremes.  At one extreme is thinking that any violation of a 
FRAND commitment is an antitrust violation as well.  In the first 
instance FRAND obligations are contractual, and most breaches of 
contract do not violate any antitrust law.  The other extreme is thinking 
that, because a FRAND violation is a breach of contract, it cannot also 
be an antitrust violation.  The question of an antitrust violation does 
not depend on whether the conduct breached a particular agreement 
 
*James B. Dinan University Professor, University of Pennsylvania 
Law School and The Wharton School.  Thanks to Doug Melamed,  
Steven Salop, and Erik Hovenkamp for comments. 
1On the role of the general antitrust laws in standard setting, discussing 
the numerous cases, see 2 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ET AL., IP AND 
ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW , Ch. 35 (3d ed. 2015 & 2019 Supp.); 
13 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶¶2230-2235 (4th ed. 2019). 
22 HOVENKAMP, IP AND ANTITRUST, id., §35.01[C][1]. 
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but rather on whether it restrained trade under §1 of the Sherman Act, 
was unreasonably exclusionary under §2 of the Sherman Act, or 
amounted to an anticompetitive condition or understanding as defined 
by  §3 of the Clayton Act.3 
 
Patent holders who participate in SSOs generally agree to 
provide timely disclosure of their patents or patent applications that 
are reasonably expected to read on the participants’ technology.4 They 
also agree in advance to license their patents thought to be essential to 
the standard on FRAND terms.  The Patent Act itself does not impose 
this obligation.  As a result, patentees who are not involved in SSOs 
have no obligation other than market pressures to submit their patents 
to a standard or engage in FRAND licensing.  In networked 
technologies, however, these market pressures can be significant.  For 
example, if a patentee refuses to commit its patented technology to an 
industry standard, the SSO may adopt a different standard that is not 
 
3See Clayton Act §3, 15 U.S.C. §15 (condemning certain sales “on the 
condition, agreement, or understanding” that the buyer will not deal 
in the goods of a competitor).  Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §45, is said to reach everything that the 
Sherman Act reaches plus some additional conduct, but we look 
mainly at Sherman and Clayton Act standards.  FTC v. Brown Shoe 
Co., Inc., 384 U.S. 316 (1966). 
4On SSO members’ duty to disclose, see, e.g., Qualcomm, Inc. v. 
Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 1015-1019 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Apple, 
Inc. v. Samsung Elect. Co., Ltd, 2012 WL 1672493, *13 (N.D. Ca. 
May 14, 2012); Peter S. Menell, Economic Analysis of Network 
Effects and Intellectual Property, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 219, 301-
302 (2019); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1919-1921 
(2002); Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carol Shapiro, & Theresa 
Sullivan, Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 
603 (2007)..  However, establishing antitrust liability for failure to 
disclose has proven difficult.  See, e.g., Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 
456 (D.C.Cir. 2008); Wi-LAN Electr., Inc., 382 F.Supp.3d 1012 
(S.D.Cal. 2019). 
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believed to infringe those patents..5  Or if a patentee refuses to commit 
to license a patent to all comers on a nondiscriminatory basis, then the 
SSO may respond in the same way.6 
 
The FRAND obligation requires the patentee to licensee freely 
to all qualified participants, whether or not they are competitors of the 
patent holder.7  Further, they must settle royalty disputes in a 
reasonable manner – if necessary, through a third party, such as a court 
 
5See D. Scott Bosworth, Russell W. Mangum III, & Eric C. Matolo, 
FRAND Commitments and Royalties for Standard Essential Patents, 
19, in COMPLICATIONS AND QUANDARIES IN THE ICT SECTOR: 
STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS AND COMPETITION ISSUES (2018). 
6See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 
2012) (“Microsoft I”), citing Lemley, Standard-Setting 
Organizations, supra note __, 90 CALIF. L. REV. at 1902, 1906. 
7See, e.g., the IP policy of the Telecommunications Industry 
Association: ““A license under any Essential Patent(s), the license 
rights which are held by the undersigned Patent Holder, will be made 
available to all applicants under terms and conditions that are 
reasonable and non-discriminatory.”  In re Qualcomm, 2019 WL 
5848999 (FTC, Nov. 6, 2018); accord Microsoft II, 696 F.3d at 876.  
See also id., 696 F.3d at 884 (FRAND obligation requires firm to 
license to “all comers”); Accord Microsoft corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 
F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015) (“: a “SEP holder cannot refuse a 
license to a manufacturer who commits to paying the RAND rate.”).  
See also FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., ___ F.Supp.3d, __, 2019 WL 
2206013 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2019), at *75: 
 
For example, under the intellectual property policy of TIA 
[Telecommunications Industry Association], a SEP holder like 
Qualcomm must commit to TIA that “A license under any 
Essential Patent(s), the license rights which are held by the 
undersigned Patent Holder, will be made available to all 
applicants under terms and conditions that are reasonable and 
non-discriminatory.” 
(quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm, 2018 WL 
5848999, at *3.). 
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or arbitrator.8  Such agreements may also be subject to compulsory 
arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.9 
 
The FRAND system facilitates competition by assuring new 
firms as well as existing ones that they will be able to operate on the 
networked technology.  Royalties to the owners of these standard 
essential patents (SEPs) are generally measured by the value that the 
contributed patent makes to the standard.10  Importantly, tribunals 
seek to measure these values “ex ante,” or prior to the patent’s 
adoption into a standard and at a time when there are a fuller range of 
 
8See, e.g., Interdigital Tech. Corp. v. Pegatron Corp., 2016 WL 
234433 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2016) (compelling arbitration); ASUS 
Computer Int’l v. Interdigital, Inc., 2015 WL 5186262 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 
4 2015) (similar); HTC corp. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 
2019 WL 277479 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2019), app. pending (5th Cir. 
Feb. 28, 2019) (discussing duty to arbitrate).  See HOVENKAMP, ET AL., 
IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note __, §35.05;  Mark A. Lemley & Carl 
Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for 
Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135 (2013); 
Jorge L. Contreras & David L. Newman, Developing A  Framework 
for Arbitrating Standard-Essential Patent Disputes, 2014 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 23; J. Gregory Sidak, Mandating Final-Offer Arbitration of 
FRAND Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 18 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 1 (2014). 
99 U.S.C. §§1-2.  See, e.g., ASUS Computer, supra; and see Jorge L. 
Contreras & David L. Newman, Developing A Framework for 
Arbitrating Standards-Essential Patent Disputes, 2014 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 23 (2014). 
10See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1041 
(9th Cir. 2015) (considering “the objective value each [patent] 
contributed to each standard, given the quality of the technology and 
the available alternatives as well as the importance of those 
technologies to Microsoft’s business”).  See Thomas F. Cotter, Erik 
Hovenkamp, & Norman Siebrasse, Demystifying Patent Holdup, 76 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. ___ (2019) (forthcoming), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3338026.  
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competitive alternatives.11 Once the standard is adopted and 
implementers have incorporated it into their own technologies, a 
standard essential patent is likely to be in a much stronger position, 
approaching monopoly in some cases.12  Patents that are committed in 
this way are described as being “FRAND encumbered.”13 
 
Having a patent declared standard essential can increase its 
value considerably, mainly because it steers developmental decision 
making in favor of that particular technology.  When a firm makes a 
commitment to develop its products under a particular standard, it 
wants assurance that it will have a durable right to operate under that 
standard at reasonable royalty rates.   This process naturally leads to 
considerable path dependence in standards, as it encourages firms to 
develop their own technology in ways that ensure interoperability.14 
 
This phenomenon of increased value for SEPs also motivates 
patent owning firms to “over-declare” – that is, to assert that patents 
are standard essential when subsequent litigation or analysis 
 
11E.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (“The hypothetical negotiation tries, as best as possible, to 
recreate the ex ante licensing negotiation scenario and to describe the 
resulting agreement. In other words, if infringement had not occurred, 
willing parties would have executed a license agreement specifying a 
certain royalty payment scheme.”); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 
2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wa. Apr. 25, 2013);  
12 See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, 
Patent Pools, and Standard Setting 119, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND 
THE ECONOMY (Adam B. Jaffe, et al, eds., 2001). 
13E.g., FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., *6, 2017 WL 2774406 (N.D. Cal. June 
26, 2017). 
14Cotter, Hovenkamp, and Siebrasse, supra note __.  On path 
dependence, see Steven N. Durlauf, Path Dependence, in THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 10094 (3d ed. 2018); Douglas 
Puffert, Path Dependence in Technical Standards, in THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 10106 (3d ed. 2018).  On 
standardization and path dependence, see Joseph Farrell and Garth 
Saloner,  Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND 
J. ECON. 70 (1985). 
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determines that they are not.  As many as one-third to more than half 
of declared SEPs are very likely not essential to the standard for which 
they were declared15  In fact, overall infringement rates for SEP 
patents are not materially different from those for non-SEP patents.16  
A declaration of non-infringement means that, although the patent 
might be valid, it does not in fact read on the defendant’s particular 
device or process.  The problem is exacerbated by the fact that, for the 
most part SSOs have no process for reviewing or questioning 
individual participant’s declarations that a patent they are offering is 
in fact standard essential.17 
 
Ex ante, a patent may offer one of many technological paths to 
a certain goal.  However, ex post, after a standard has been adopted 
and others have developed their technologies in reliance, the range of 
acceptable alternatives can decrease dramatically.  As a result the 
 
15See Robin Stitzing, Pekka Saaskilahti, Jimmy Royer, and Marc Van 
Audenrode, Over-Declaration of Standard Essential Patents and 
Determinants of Essentiality (SSRN working paper, 11 Sep 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2951617.  See 
also Cyber Creative Institute Co., Evaluation of LTE Essential Patents 
Declared to ETSI (Version 3.0, June 2013), available at 
http://www.cybersoken.com/file/lte03EN.pdf (concluding that 
roughly 56% of patents declared essential to ETSI standard were in 
fact so; there was also a wide range among individual companies).  For 
good commentary, see Jorge L. Contreras, Essentiality and Standards-
Essential Patents 209, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL 
STANDARDIZATION LAW – ANTITRUST, COMPETITION AND PATENT 
LAW (Jorge L. Contreras, ed., 2017). 
16 Mark A. Lemley & Timothy Simcoe, How Essential are Standard-
Essential Patents?, 104 CORN. L. REV. 607, 527 (2019).  The authors 
conclude that finding of infringement of SEP and non-SEP patents 
occur at about the same rate, roughly 30%.  As a result, SEPs “don’t 
seem to be all that essential, at least when they make it to court.”  Id. 
at 608. 
17See id. at 610. 
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patents whose path is adopted become much more valuable.18  In that 
case, a firm’s ability to evade the FRAND obligation by charging 
selectively higher royalties to some licensees or conditioning licenses 
on the purchase of other technology can be extremely valuable to the 
patentee, but costly to implementers of the standard and disruptive of 
the SSO’s developmental goals.19  In general, the goal of FRAND is 
to make patents available to participants at a price equivalent to what 
the patent would have been worth in the market prior to the time it was 
declared essential.  That is, the relevant question is What was the value 
of the patent’s contribution to the standard at a time when competitive 
alternatives may have been available, as opposed to a later time when 
other firms have dedicated themselves to the standard.20 
 
 The standard essential patent process has produced several 
disputes.   Sometimes patentees may attempt to evade the general 
FRAND requirements that a standard essential patent must be licensed 
without condition to all users of the standard and on nondiscriminatory 
terms. Some owners of standard essential patents who also make 
products that practice them may prefer not to license a particular 
patent to anyone.  Or they may impose exclusive dealing or minimum 
market share requirements or discounts on licensees.21  Alternatively, 
the owner of a FRAND-encumbered patent may tie it to an 
 
18See Jay P Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND's Forever: Standards, 
Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 233-
35 (2014). 
9See William F. Lee & A. Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious 
Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 CORN. L. REV. 385, 404-09 (2016); 
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty 
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1994-2010 (2007) 
19See, e.g., FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 2019 WL 2206013 (N. D. Cal. 
May 21, 2019), *106-107 (finding that Qualcomm attempted to 
leverage higher royalty rates by taking advantage of ex post SEP status 
plus its threat to withhold products from licensee who challenged the 
higher rates). 
20See Cotter, Hovenkamp, & Siebrasse, supra note __. 
21On these practices when involving standard essential patents, see see 
Erik Hovenkamp, Tying, Exclusivity, and Standard-Essential Patents, 
19 COL. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 79, 108-110 (2017). 
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unregulated device.  While FRAND license rates are regulated by the 
SSO, product prices are not.  By using a patent exclusively in its own 
manufactured device, the patentee might be able to obtain its full post-
commitment monopoly return.  In that case the seller can obtain an 
overcharge on the device that operates to offset the reduced FRAND 
royalty.  This use of tying to avoid regulated rates is well known in 
antitrust.22  The owner of a FRAND patent may also refuse to license 
it to competitors in the market for devices that practice the patent, once 
again in violation of its FRAND obligation to license to all qualified 
users on nondiscriminatory terms.23  The result is reduced competition 
in the downstream market for devices or processes that employ the 
patent at issue, and in extreme cases even the creation of monopoly. 
 
While these various attempts to evade FRAND obligations 
very likely breach the patentee’s contractual obligations, only a subset 
also constitute antitrust violations.  This does not mean that the 
standard-setting and FRAND process in which the conduct occurred 
is irrelevant.  To the contrary, as in any antitrust case, it forms part of 
the market environment in which antitrust conduct must be evaluated.  
In her 2019 Qualcomm decision, Judge Koh addressed tying and 
exclusive dealing claims under general antitrust principles, and refusal 
to deal claims under the standards that the Supreme Court had 
developed in its Aspen24 and Trinko25 decisions.26 Although her 
opinion devoted considerable space to the importance of standard 
essential patents and the relevance of FRAND commitments, she 
addressed the antitrust claims largely without reference to standard 
setting or FRAND.  Qualcomm’s refusals to license, selective 
 
22On the use of tying arrangements for rate regulation avoidance, see 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶1715b,c (4th ed. 2018).  On this use in the context of FRAND, see 
Erik Hovenkamp, Tying, Exclusivity, supra, note __, 102-105. 
23 See note __, supra. 
24Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 
(1985). 
25 Verizon Communic., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 
U.S.  398 (2004). 
26 FTC v. Qualcomm Corp., 2019 WL 2206013 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 
2019). 
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licensing that excluded competitors, or other discriminatory practices 
were unlawful under the antitrust laws in any event.27  Nevertheless, 
their anticompetitive effects become more transparent when one views 
the extent to which they undermined an output- and innovation- 
enhancing joint enterprise whose social value was not being called 
into question. 
 
 SSOs operated by multiple firms are joint ventures.28  For bona 
fide joint ventures,29 the purpose of the antitrust laws is not to destroy 
the venture or undermine its principal purposes, but rather to evaluate 
how the challenged restraint operates within the venture and condemn 
unreasonably harmful restraints.30  SSOs should be addressed in the 
same manner. The goal of the standard setting venture is to facilitate 
competitive operation and entry, interoperability, as well as preserve 
appropriate competitive incentives for research and development.  
Antitrust analysis necessarily involves testing conduct against these 
goals, but only to the extent of looking for practices that are 
anticompetitive.  This means it must identify practices that reduce 
market wide output unreasonably or that are unnecessarily 
exclusionary or harmful to consumers in other ways, given that they 
occurred within the venture.  Antitrust law has no statutory 
authorization to police the standard essential patent process aside from 
these goals. 
 
 A firm’s violation of its FRAND commitment is very likely a 
breach of contract, as several decisions have held.31  To be sure, the 
 
27See discussion infra, text at notes __; and see HOVENKAMP, ET AL., 
IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note __, §35.05. 
28 For treatment of SSOs as joint ventures, see 13 PHILLIP E. AREEDA 
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, Ch. 22B, C (4th ed. 2019). 
29That is, claimed joint ventures that are not simple fronts for cartels. 
30See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW, Ch 15 (4th ed. 2017). 
31E.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012); 
Realtek Semiconductor corp. v. LSI Corp, 946 F. Supp.2d 998 
(N.D.Cal. 2013); In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 
F.Supp.2d 903, 923 (N.D.Il. 2013).  See also Realtek Semiconductor 
Corp. v. LSI Corp., 2013 WL 2181717 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2013) 
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FRAND contract is incomplete, in the sense that not every term is 
specified in detail.  But participants are subject to a contractual duty 
to bargain in good faith, with some terms being filled in by the courts 
as necessary.  The breach of contract question does not depend on 
whether the conduct reduced market output or excluded a rival 
unreasonably.  It certainly does not depend on the existence of any 
party’s market power.  Remedies are ordinarily contract damages or 
an injunction.  Nonparties to the contract will typically be able to 
obtain relief only to the extent that they are third-party beneficiaries.  
However, the courts have had little difficulty concluding that 
participating members of the SSO are third-party beneficiaries of 
FRAND commitments.32  In all events, challengers will not be able to 
obtain antitrust law’s treble damages unless they can prove an antitrust 
violation. 
 
 Whether a firm’s breach of a FRAND commitment also 
violates the antitrust laws depends on whether the conduct in question 
causes competitive harm of a sort that the antitrust laws recognize.33 
In the case of §1 of the Sherman Act34 this requires a showing of a 
relevant agreement that is reasonably calculated to reduce market 
output.  If the conduct is reasonably ancillary to other arguably 
procompetitive activity, the court must also assess market power and 
anticompetitive effects.   In the case of §2 of the Sherman Act or §3 
of the Clayton Act, which reaches mainly tying and exclusive dealing, 
it will require a showing of conduct that is unreasonably exclusionary 
and has an anticompetitive effect. 
 
 
(FRAND commitment was enforceable contract precluding patentee 
from bringing ITC claim for infringement before it offered a license). 
32See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F.Supp.2d 1023 
(W.D. Wa. 2012) (product developer was third party beneficiary 
entitled to enforce FRAND obligation); Realtek Semiconducor corp. 
v. LSI Corp., 946 F.Supp.2d 998 (N.D. Ca. 2013); Apple, Inc. v. 
Motorola Mobility, Inc., 2012 WL 5416941 (W.D. Wi. Oct. 29, 2012). 
33E.g., McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(supplier’s breach of contract not an antitrust violation because it did 
not cause competitive harm). 
3415 U.S.C. §1.   
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II.  FRAND Violations and Antitrust 
  
 A few FRAND violations that are also challengeable as 
antitrust violations involve royalty disputes or entitlement to an 
injunction.35  Many fall into the general category of refusals to deal or 
discriminatory dealing.  These come in many kinds, and the 
differences are important for antitrust purposes.  Unilateral refusals – 
where one firm acting alone refuses to deal – are unlawful less 
frequently than concerted refusals to license, or boycotts, which occur 
when two or more firms acting in concert refuse to deal.36  In addition, 
refusals to deal can be both simple and conditional.37  Discriminatory 
dealing occurs when a firm deals under different terms with different 
contracting partners, such as competitors and noncompetitors, in a 
way that harms competition. 
 
A.  Refusals to Deal 
 
Although the Patent Act has some provisions relevant to 
refusals to license,38 in general a refusal to license a patent is simply a 
subset of refusals to deal  A simple refusal is one where the holder 
refuses to deal no matter what, or where the refusal is conditioned on 
a firm’s status that cannot readily be changed.  For example, a firm 
might agree to sell to competitors but not noncompetitors.  The only 
way a competing firm could obtain a deal in that case would be to exit 
from the market in which it was competing. 
 
By contrast, conditional refusals to deal are actions in which 
the rights holder expresses a willingness to deal only if some condition 
is met.  The basis for antitrust attacks on conditional refusals is much 
broader than for unconditional refusals.  Tying and exclusive dealing 
are two common examples. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, the provision 
historically used to condemn tying and exclusive dealing, makes it 
 
35See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
36On concerted refusals to deal, see 13 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶2201-2205 (4th ed. 2019). 
37 See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
38 See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
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unlawful to sell something only on the “condition, agreement, or 
understanding” that the purchaser not deal in the goods of a 
competitor.39 In the only place where the Sherman and Clayton Acts 
mention patents, this provision makes clear that its refusal to deal rule 
applies to things “whether patented or unpatented.”40  Nevertheless, 
§3’s coverage is limited to “goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, 
supplies, or other commodities.”41  Because FRAND obligations by 
design are not tied to any particular good, §3 of the Clayton Act 
presumably does not cover the conditional refusal to license a FRAND 
patent, unless the condition in question is tied to “goods, wares,” etc. 
 
In any event, these same requirements have largely been read 
into the more general language of the Sherman Act which contains no 
limitation on its coverage.  This explains why cases such as 
Qualcomm, dealing with refusal to license FRAND patents, proceed 
largely under the Sherman Act42 or perhaps in the case of FTC 
proceedings under §5 of the FTC Act.43  Just as the Sherman Act, that 
statute’s prohibition of unfair methods of competition contains no 
limitation respecting patents. 
 
When the subject of the deal is a patent, the Patent Act itself 
may be relevant.  The Patent Act does not create an antitrust immunity 
for unilateral refusals to license, although it does immunize certain 
“misuse” claims. The Patent Misuse Reform Act provides that: 
 
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement 
or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief 
or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent 
right by reason of his having… (4) refused to license or use 
any rights to the patent….44 
 
 
3915 U.S.C. §14. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 2019 WL 2206013 (N.D.Cal. May 21, 
2019). 
43 15 U.S.C. §45. 
4435 U.S.C. §271(d)(4). 
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 Patent “misuse” is a judge-made set of rules that emanated 
entirely from the Patent Act. While many of these resembled antitrust 
rules, they often reached beyond antitrust law.45  The quoted 
provision, which is part of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act,46 was 
intended to limit the reach of patent misuse.  Today patent misuse is 
in sharp decline and there are few recent cases finding misuse.47 
 
Whether this provision of the Patent Misuse Reform Act 
should be read additionally to confer an antitrust immunity is doubtful. 
More realistically, it should be interpreted as an attempt to narrow 
misuse liability so as to bring it more in line with antitrust principles.48  
When Congress wants to create an antitrust immunity it knows how to 
do so.  Several statutes provide that the antitrust laws “do not apply” 
to a particular type of conduct, or that particular conduct “shall not be 
unlawful under the antitrust laws.”49  Here, by contrast, the statutory 
 
45On patent “misuse,” see 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ET AL., IP AND 
ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, Ch. 3 (3d ed. 2017 & Supp.); 10 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶¶1781-1782 (4th ed. 2018); DARYL LIM, PATENT MISUSE AND 
ANTITRUST LAW: EMPIRICAL, DOCTRINAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 
(2013).  On the reach of misuse beyond antitrust law, see, e.g., Senza-
Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (tying 
arrangement could constitute misuse and be defense to infringement 
claim even though it did not constitute an antitrust violation). 
46Codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d). 
47See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note __, ¶1781. 
48See Richard Calkins, Patent Law: the Impact of the 1988 Patent 
Misuse Reform Act and Noerr-Pennington Doctrine on Misuse 
Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 175 (1989) 
(making this argument). 
49See, e.g., Charitable Donation Antitrust Immmunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§37(b) (“the antitrust laws … shall not apply to charitable gift 
annuities….”); Confirmation of Antitrust Status of Graduate Medical 
Resident Matching Programs, 15 U.S.C. §37b(b)(2) (it “shall not be 
unlawful under the antitrust laws to sponsor…”).  See also 1B PHILLIP 
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶249-251 (4th 
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language removes liability for “misuse or illegal extension of the 
patent right,” which is classical misuse language.  Given the principle 
that immunities are construed narrowly, the statute should be 
construed as narrowing misuse doctrine but not antitrust rules.50 
 
 In any event, this statutory limitation applies only to 
unconditional refusals to license.  The very next subsection of the 
same statute, passed at the same time, also states that misuse should 
not apply to a firm that: 
 
(5) condition[s] the license of any rights to the patent or the 
sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to 
rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, 
unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has 
market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented 
product on which the license or sale is conditioned.51 
 
Far from exonerating conditional refusals, this subsection of 
the statute requires that conditional refusals involving tying be 
condemned only upon a finding of market power in the product upon 
which the condition is imposed – i.e., the tying product.  In its Illinois 
Tool Works decision the Supreme Court held that this provision, 
written as a limitation on the reach of misuse law, also served to 
establish a market power requirement in antitrust law.52   Misuse law 
having been narrowed, it would be perverse to have antitrust reach 
more broadly.53 As a result, the Court held, market power could not 
 
ed. 2013) (discussing other federal statutes with express immunity 
provisions).   
50E.g., Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 
231 (1979) (“It is well settled that exemptions from the antitrust laws 
are to be narrowly construed”); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 
231, 258 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
5135 U.S.C. §271(d)(5) (emphasis added). 
52Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, In., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
53See id. at 38-39, 42. 
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be presumed in an antitrust tying case from the bare existence of a 
patent.54 
 
Suppose the owner of a FRAND-encumbered patent 
conditions a license on some agreement or understanding that antitrust 
law deems anticompetitive; or else refuses to license it under any 
circumstances? 
 
1.  Conditional Refusals to License FRAND-encumbered 
Patents 
 
An unlawful conditional refusal occurs when the defendant 
refuses to sell or license some interest unless the buyer agrees to a 
condition that is determined to be anticompetitive.  Conditional refusal 
challenges usually involve tying, exclusive dealing, or a variety of 
practices sometimes described as “quasi” exclusive dealing, including 
conditional discounts, loyalty discounts, bundled discounts, most-
favored nation clauses, and the like.55 The purely vertical conditional 
refusal is addressed under ordinary rule of reason antitrust principles, 
which require a showing of market power and anticompetitive effects.  
These requirements apply whether any patents in question are 
FRAND encumbered or, indeed, whether there are any patents at all.56 
 
54Id. at 42 (“given the fact that the patent misuse doctrine provided the 
basis for the market power presumption, it would be anomalous to 
preserve the presumption in antitrust after Congress has eliminated its 
foundation,” citing 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note __, 
¶1737c). 
55On tying, see 9 & 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note __, ch. 17; 
on exclusive dealing, see 11 id., Ch. 8; for conditional discounts and 
other practices sometimes analogized to tying or exclusive dealing, 
see 3A ANTITRUST LAW ¶749 (bundled discounts); 11 id., ¶1807 
(various discounts conditioned on exclusivity or preferential 
treatment). 
56 See FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 2019 WL 2206013 (N.D.Cal. May 21, 
2019) (conditional market share discounts in exchange for chip 
purchase commitments violated antitrust laws; in some cases, 
Qualcomm conditioned chip sales on patent licenses at 
supracompetitive rates). 
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In speaking of Qualcomm’s practices targeting Apple, as well 
as other OEM’s, the court concluded that in 2013 Qualcomm gave 
Apple rebates “in exchange for Apple’s effective commitment to 
purchase modem chips exclusively from Qualcomm.”57 It was 
particularly important for Qualcomm to secure Apple’s exclusive 
business, the court concluded, because of Apple’s scale and prestige.58  
This condition foreclosed competitor Intel and other unnamed rivals 
from working with Apple for approximately three years.59  That 
practice, it should be noted, falls literally  within Clayton Act §3’s 
prohibition of anticompetitive tying and exclusive dealing of products, 
even though the case at hand was brought under §5 of the FTC Act.60  
The Sherman Act condemns this conduct under more or less the same 
standard.61 
 
Such a conditional refusal also violates a FRAND 
commitment.  Here, FRAND obligations reach much more broadly 
than do antitrust obligations.  For example, a refusal to license a 
FRAND patent to a qualified licensee unless that person also 
purchases the IP owner’s hardware would very likely violate a 
FRAND commitment “per se,” as a simple breach of contract.  Breach 
of the agreement would be unlawful without any showing of market 
power or anticompetitive effects.  The same refusal would violate the 
 
57 Id. at *55. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 See Id. at *11.  Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides that: 
 
it shall be unlawful… to lease or make a sale of goods …, or 
fix a price charged therefor, or discount from … such price, on 
the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or 
purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods .. of a 
competitors or competitors…. 
15 U.S.C. §14. 
61See 11 ANTITRUST LAW, supra note __, ¶1800c4 (noting divisions 
among the lower courts as to whether the test of illegality is the same 
under the two statutes). 
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antitrust laws only if the market power and anticompetitive effects 
requirements for an antitrust tying violation were met. 
 
In the case of a FRAND violation alone, the remedy could be 
a nonantitrust penalty for breach of contract, as well as a mandatory 
or prohibitory injunction under general equitable principles such as 
the Supreme Court applied in its eBay decision.62  Absent a finding of 
an antitrust violation, they would not be amenable to antitrust’s treble 
damages.63  Nor would they be governed by the provisions that govern 
private equity relief from antitrust violations.64  They would also not 
be governed by the very broad provision that gives the Attorney 
General the authority to obtain an injunction against an ongoing 
antitrust violation without making the usual showing that equitable 
principles favored the requested relief.65 
 
62eBay v. MercExhange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006), holding that the 
right to an injunction should be established by traditional equity 
principles, namely that:  
 
(1) that [the plaintiff] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) 
that remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate 
for that injury; (3) that considering the balance of hardships 
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is 
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction. 
63 15 U.S.C. §15. 
64 Articulated in 15 U.S.C. §26: 
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled 
to sue for and have injunctive relief … against threatened loss 
or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws,… when and 
under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief 
against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is 
granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such 
proceedings, and upon the execution of proper bond against 
damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a 
showing that the danger of irreparable loss or damage is 
immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue…. 
65 15 U.S.C. §25 (authorizing government to “prevent and restrain” 
future antitrust violations without a separate public interest showing). 
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Although the fact that a patent is FRAND-encumbered does 
not determine antitrust liability in either direction, it is hardly 
irrelevant.  On the market power question, the fact that a patent has 
been declared standard essential and subjected to FRAND 
requirements is certainly important.  Depending on the degree of path 
dependence,66 a patent may have become essential to practicing a 
particular standard, or implementers may have invested substantial 
sunk costs into the technology it covers.  In that case extraction may 
be more costly than simply paying more, or else the firm may exit 
from the market.67 
 
Questions about the market power of individual SEP patents 
are also heavily derivative of questions about the power of the 
standard setting organization for which the patent is essential.  If a 
patent is truly essential, then it has whatever power is enjoyed by the 
standard to which it is essential.  Most large SSOs that employ SEPS 
presumably have significant power. In that case, an essential patent 
can be presumed to have market power as well.  In many other 
settings, however, standards are less likely to have power for the 
simple reason that the organization is only one of many alternative 
standard setting organizations, or else because compliance with a 
standard is not all that valuable.68 
 
66See Cotter, Hovenkamp, and Siebrasse, supra note __. 
67See Jorge L. Contreras, Much Ado About Hold-up, 2019 ILL. L. REV. 
875;  FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT 
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 61 (2011); Anne Layne-
Farrar, Gerard Llobet & A. Jorge Padilla, Preventing Patent Hold Up: 
An Economic Assessment of Ex Ante Licensing Negotiations in 
Standard Setting, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 455 (2009).  See also Douglas 
Melamed & Carl Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND 
Commitments More Effective, 127 YALE L.J. 2110 (2018). 
68See, e.g., Brookins v. International Motor Contest Assn., 219 F.3d 
849 (8th Cir. 2000) (defendant IMCA was one out of many racing 
bodies and its standard lacked power over the general market for oval 
track automobile racing); Sanjuan v. American Board of Psychiatry & 
Neurology, 40 F.3d 247 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 
(1996) (physicians excluded from specialized professional association 
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SEP status is also important to questions about the breadth of 
a relevant antitrust market.  For example, once a patent has been 
designated standard essential, substitute patents that are not essential 
are poor alternatives for technology operating on that network.  This 
is simply a special case of the proposition that regulatory requirements 
or accepted business practices can serve to narrow the scope of 
relevant markets, thus giving firms greater power.  If compliance with 
a standard is necessary to doing business in a market, then the market 
will necessarily be limited to complying producers.69 
 
could still practice their profession without difficulty where 
membership in the association was not necessary to practice); Clamp-
All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478 (1st Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989) (association that graded and 
approved underground plumbing fixtures lacked power when it 
appeared that few market participants paid much attention to their 
recommendations). 
69E.g., United States v. Phillipsburg Nat. Bank & Trust co.,399 U.S. 
350, 361-362 (1970) (local regulatory requirements in effect at the 
time served to reduce the size of geographic markets); See Hospital 
Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1387 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987) (“certificate of need” requirement 
served to protect incumbent hospitals from new competition); E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours and co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 443 (4th 
Cir. 2011) (noting relevance of regulatory requirements in 
determining size of geographic antitrust market);  For example,  the 
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines call for narrower markets in case 
where some products but not others have regulatory approval.  See 
United States Dept. of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines §4.2.2 (2010), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010.  
See also 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶572b (4th ed. 2015) (on regulatory requirements as narrowing 
markets to as to include the range of products approved by the 
regulator).  Barriers to entry, which enhance market power, also 
include regulatory requirements that give an advantage to incumbents.  
See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.2d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 
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To be sure, the patent may have been mis-declared and not be 
essential at all to practice under a certain standard.70  But given that 
declaration is a voluntary act of the patentee it seems wise to presume 
that a SEP_declared patent is essential and thus confers significant 
power.  Important evidence that it is not essential is a finding that the 
implementers technology, while practicing the standard, does not 
infringe the patent.  Such a patent may have no more power than the 
general run of non-SEP patents. 
 
The market power query determines whether a firm (or cartel) 
has sufficient power to increase price to supracompetitive levels 
without losing so many sales that the increase is unprofitable?71  Any 
factor that limits substitution, including SEP status, can result in a 
narrower market definition.  To illustrate, absent an industry standard, 
builders might regard steel and plastic (PVC) conduit for electric 
wiring as effective substitutes.  However, once a standard with market 
force approves only steel conduit, as happened in the Allied Tube case, 
a sole producer or cartel of producers of that conduit could have 
significant power.72 
 
In sum, when an antitrust tribunal assesses an antitrust claim, 
two of the most important elements, power and anticompetitive 
effects, can be heavily driven by SEP status. Conditionally refusing to 
license a FRAND-encumbered patent when the relevant agreement 
 
1007); Rochester Drug Co-op, Inc. v. Braintree Labs., 712 f.Supp.2d 
308 (D. Del. 2010). 
70 On the phenomenon of over-declaring standard essential patents, 
see discussion supra, text at notes __. 
71 See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶501 (4th ed. 2014). 
72 Once PVC conduit was approved, it became a market leader. See 
https://www.persistencemarketresearch.com/market-
research/electrical-conduit-pipe-market.asp.  However, PVC conduit 
had been the target of a standard-setting boycott organized by steel 
conduit manufacturers, organized as a cartel. See Allied Tube & 
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988).   If the 
boycott had succeeded it would very likely have excluded PVC from 
many building uses. 
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requires licensing is clearly a breach of contract, but it can also be an 
antitrust violation when these conditions are met. 
 
Conditional dealing is unlawful under the antitrust laws only 
when both power and anticompetitive effects are shown.  
Conventionally, the relevant anticompetitive effect is market 
foreclosure.  Here, the primary question is whether the condition made 
it more costly or impossible for a participating firm to operate on the 
network.  Under the restraint of trade standard of §1 of the Sherman 
Act, antitrust harm also includes reduced output and higher prices in 
output markets. Depending on the facts, the victims could be either 
excluded rivals or those whose costs have been increased; or else 
downstream firms, including consumers, forced to pay higher prices. 
 
2.  Unconditional Refusals: FRAND Patents and Path Dependent 
Technologies 
 
In Aspen, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld a plaintiff’s 
jury verdict in a case involving an unconditional, unilateral refusal to 
deal.73  Although criticism of Aspen has been widespread, much of it 
seems to be driven by a tendency to confuse the Aspen case with the 
very different essential facilities doctrine.74  The essential facility 
doctrine is asset based.  By contrast, Aspen’s refusal to deal rule is 
conduct based.  Further, the two rules are based on very different 
theories of incentives and competitive harm.75 
 
Antitrust analysis of unconditional, unilateral refusals to deal 
is difficult for several reasons.  First, an overly broad rule can 
facilitate competitor free riding on a dominant firm’s investment.  
Smaller rivals might like nothing more than to have ready access to 
some input that the dominant firm has developed, thus avoiding the 
risk and development costs.  In that case, forcing the dominant firm to 
supply them can reduce competitors’ incentives to invest for 
 
73Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highland Skiing  Corp., 472 U.S. 585 
(1985).  Justice White did not participate. 
74See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
75See discussion infra text at notes __. 
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themselves.76  For similar reasons, sharing of an important input by 
two firms may facilitate collusion.77  As a result, “essentiality” is a 
necessary condition for illegality.78  If a competing firm can easily 
duplicate a particular input for itself, antitrust law should not require 
sharing. 
 
Second, remedial problems can be formidable.  In order to 
enforce a dealing order, the court must both identify the asset that is 
subject to compulsory dealing and determine the price.79  Unless some 
mechanism is identified for establishing the price and other terms of 
sale, these tasks threaten to involve the antitrust tribunal in a form of 
price regulation.  In Aspen itself, the antitrust litigation originated in a 
dispute about revenue sharing which the Supreme Court did not 
resolve.80  As the Supreme Court later observed in its Trinko decision, 
 
76See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note __, ¶¶771-772. 
77See discussion infra, text at notes __. (discussing 1975 Colorado 
Attorney General complaint of price fixing case against the ski 
companies). 
78See, e.g., Pittsburg County Rural Water Dist. No. 7 v. City of 
McAlester, 358 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 810 
(2004) (municipal water supply not essential when other sources were 
available); Massachusetts School of Law at Andover v. ABA, 107 
F.3d 1026 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 907 (1997) (law school 
hiring conference not essential when there was no showing that it 
could not be duplicated); Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of 
Wisconsin v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 1184 (1996) (HMO not essential when there were 
existing, viable alternatives).  Other decisions are discussed in 3B 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note __, ¶773b. 
79By contrast, if the claim is of concerted refusal to deal the court may 
do no more than issue an injunction dissolving the agreement and 
permitting each firm to act independently.  3B AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP supra note __, ¶774c, e. 
80The jury approved a damage award based on a decline in the 
plaintiff’s profits during the years that the parties were disputing the 
revenue sharing venture.  The expert had done this essentially by 
comparing the plaintiff’s share of revenues during this period with 
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which distinguished but did not overrule Aspen, the asset that the 
plaintiff is requesting may be one that was never separately placed on 
the market at all, but rather was simply some intermediate good in a 
production process.81 That obligates the court to identify the scope of 
the good or service for which compulsory dealing is appropriate.  For 
these reasons antitrust policy toward unilateral refusals to deal has 
always been conservative. 
 
The same considerations that govern the market power issue 
in cases involving conditional refusals to deal and FRAND-
encumbered patents at least presumptively apply to unconditional 
refusals.82  Because they are unilateral and do not have a contractual 
condition attached to them, simple refusals to deal are generally 
addressed under §2 of the Sherman Act.  The delimiting factors for 
identifying an anticompetitive unilateral refusal to deal are (1) a 
history of voluntary dealing; (2) an asset that can be separately 
identified and sold; (3) a mechanism for identifying the scope and 
terms of the dealing obligation; and (4) some basis for thinking that 
relief will make the market perform more competitively.83 
 
In Trinko the Supreme Court affirmed a dismissal where most 
of these requirements were not met.  First, there was no history of 
voluntary dealing between the ILEC and CLEC telephone exchange 
carriers.84  To the contrary, the parent phone company, AT&T, had a 
 
revenues during the period prior to the dispute.  See 738 F.2d 1509, 
1523 (10th Cir. 1984) 
81Verizon Communic., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 
540 U.S. 398, 409-410 (2004).  See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
82See discussion, supra, text at notes __. 
83For the decisions, see 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, 
supra note __, ¶772. 
84“ILEC,” or Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier, refers to the 
telephone company established as the primary service provider for a 
particular region, and which owns and has responsibility for most of 
the infrastructure.  By contrast, “CLEC,” or Competitive Local 
Exchange Carrier, refers to a firm that is authorized under the 1996 
Telecommunications Act to attach into the network at any feasible 
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long history of resisting attachment to its network.85  Any cooperation 
that existed was solely by virtue of the Telecommunications Act, 
which compelled it under the supervision of the FCC and state 
regulatory agencies.86 
 
point in order to provide services in competition with the ILEC.  See 
47 U.S.C. §251(c) (2), which requires ILEC’s to: 
….provide for the facilities and equipment of any requesting 
telecommunications carrier, interconnection with the local 
exchange carrier's network-- 
(A) for the transmission and routing of telephone 
exchange service and exchange access; 
(B) at any technically feasible point within the carrier's 
network; 
(C) that is at least equal in quality to that provided by 
the local exchange carrier to itself or to any subsidiary, 
affiliate, or any other party to which the carrier 
provides interconnection; and 
(D) on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, 
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory…. 
85See MCI Communic. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 
1981) (tracing history of AT&T’s refusal to interconnect).  See, e.g., 
Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 
(D.C.Cir.1956) (striking down extreme case of AT&T refusal to 
interconnect even to non-electronic listening device).  See Joseph H. 
Weber, The Bell System Divestiture: Background, Implementation, 
and Outcome, 61 FED. COMM. L. J. 21 (2008); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004 COL. BUS. L. REV. 335, 
367-369 (2004). 
86See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409: 
The refusal to deal alleged in the present case does not fit 
within the limited exception recognized in Aspen Skiing. The 
complaint does not allege that Verizon voluntarily engaged in 
a course of dealing with its rivals, or would ever have done so 
absent statutory compulsion. 
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Second, the dealing obligations contained in the 
Telecommunications Act were not limited to discrete assets that had 
historically been bought and sold in an independent market.  Many of 
them were “deep in the bowels” of Verizon, as Justice Scalia put it. 87  
The 1996 Telecommunications Act permitted a CLEC to obtain 
interconnection at “any technically feasible point” in the incumbent 
carrier’s network.88  It did not matter whether the output at that point 
had ever been marketed to any third party.  It is one thing to require 
dealing with respect to an identifiable asset that can be and has been 
sold separately; it is quite another to identify some intermediate step 
in a firm’s own production process and require separate dealing at that 
point.  By contrast, FRAND agreements apply to patents, which are 
distinct and freely licensable assets.  Further, the FRAND agreement 
itself manifests a commitment to license them to a variety of takers. 
 
 
87Verizon Communic., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 
540 U.S. 398, 409-410 (2004) (distinguishing Aspen): 
In Aspen Skiing, what the defendant refused to provide to its 
competitor was a product that it already sold at retail—to 
oversimplify slightly, lift tickets representing a bundle of 
services to skiers….  In the present case, by contrast, the 
services allegedly withheld are not otherwise marketed or 
available to the public. The sharing obligation imposed by the 
1996 [Telecommunications] Act created “something brand 
new”—“the wholesale market for leasing network elements.” 
Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S., at 528, 122 
S.Ct. 1646. The unbundled elements offered pursuant to § 
251(c)(3) exist only deep within the bowels of Verizon; they 
are brought out on compulsion of the 1996 Act and offered not 
to consumers but to rivals, and at considerable expense and 
effort. New systems must be designed and implemented 
simply to make that access possible—indeed, it is the failure 
of one of those systems that prompted the present complaint. 
88 See note __, supra. 
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The third and fourth elements involved determination of the 
scope of dealing, as well as the mechanisms for assuring that dealing 
obligations would further competition.  In Trinko these tasks were 
taken over by federal (FCC) and state (PSC)89 regulators, who 
responded to and disciplined interconnection violations.  The Court 
concluded that these agencies had been doing their job adequately, 
performing as “an effective steward of the antitrust function.”90  In 
fact, at the time of litigation the FCC had already disciplined the 
defendant for at least one refusal to interconnect.91 
 
Aspen itself has been described as lying “at or near the outer 
boundary” of antitrust liability under §2 of the Sherman Act.92 It 
certainly did stretch the doctrine very far.  Aspen occurred in a poorly 
 
89Referring to the New York Public Service Commission, which has 
authority over the telephone system within that state. 
90Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414. 
91Id. at 413 (noting that FCC had investigated the complaint, imposed 
a “substantial fine,” and set up monitoring to assess compliance with 
a remedy order). 
92Id. at 409: 
Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer boundary of § 
2 liability. The Court there found significance in the 
defendant's decision to cease participation in a cooperative 
venture.  The unilateral termination of a voluntary (and thus 
presumably profitable) course of dealing suggested a 
willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an 
anticompetitive end. 
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defined market93 with significant collusion risks.94  By contrast, 
standard setting over patented technology in a many firm market need 
not pose similar risks, although they cannot entirely be ruled out.  
Further, the only network benefits that accrued to the firms in Aspen 
were economies of scale and scope from being able to market both of 
the parties’ mountains together.  By contrast, the network benefits that 
can accrue from multi-firm standard setting in a market requiring 
interoperability are substantial.  Loss of these effects would result in 
higher prices or deficient service, both of which are within the 
boundaries of the Sherman Act’s remedial concerns.  While the 
Antitrust Law treatise generally defends a restrictive approach to 
unilateral duties to deal,95 it has recognized an exception for refusals 
in networked industries in which coordination is required and a firm 
has significant market power: 
 
 
93Less than ten years after the decision the government permitted the 
two parties to merge, which was clearly inconsistent with the 
proposition that Aspen, Colorado, constituted a relevant geographic 
market.  If it had, this would have been a merger to monopoly.  See 
“Ski Merger May Perk Up Aspen,” NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 20, 1993).  
The market in question was for “destination” ski resorts, as the jury 
found, but it was also permitted to find a relevant submarket for 
downhill skiing in the Aspen area.  See the Tenth Circuit’s opinion, 
738 F.2d 1509, 1513 (10th Cir. 1984).   A “destination” ski resort is 
one that people travel too from long distances, and this suggested that 
a large group of Rocky Mountain resorts as well as skiing facilities 
elsewhere were in the geographic market. The defendant complained 
that there could not be both a relevant market and a relevant 
submarket, but the Tenth Circuit agreed with the plaintiff that this 
argument had been waived.  On the general irrelevance of 
“submarkets,” see 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶533 (4th ed. 2015). 
94See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 591 n. 9, noting that the Colorado Attorney 
General had filed a complaint that the collaboration on tickets 
facilitated price fixing.  It was settled by a consent decree that 
permitted the venture to continue but with conditions. 
953B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶771 (4th ed. 2015). 
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Liability can make sense in network industries where the 
network has evolved with multifirm participation and 
cooperation is necessary for the network’s continued efficient 
operation.  The case for compelled dealing is stronger if the 
network developed in a cooperative regime and a dealing order 
serves mainly to preserve a preexisting practice rather than 
create a new one.96 
 
The Aspen Court made clear that it was not applying the 
essential facility doctrine.97 While the two rationales for compelling 
dealing under the antitrust laws are often confused, they rest on very 
different grounds. The essential facility doctrine is much more 
difficult to justify outside of the regulatory context.  It is based on the 
idea that some “facilities,” or assets, are so essential in and of 
themselves that the owner has a duty to share them.  By contrast, the 
Aspen rule is based on induced reliance from a course of conduct. 
 
Further, while the essential facility doctrine is conducive to 
competitor passivity, the Aspen rule does precisely the opposite: it 
serves to protect and thereby encourage reasonable investment.  The 
idea that a facility is “essential” indicates that rivals are unable and 
need not bother to develop their own alternatives.  Instead, they should 
seek a right to connect into the dominant firm’s facility.  By contrast, 
the Aspen rule is based on a premise of initial voluntary commitment 
to invest jointly.  If one firm later repudiates that commitment in a way 
that threatens to undermine it, those investment backed expectations 
are lost.  The Aspen rule thus serves to protect the integrity of 
investment in those circumstances where noncompetitive outcomes 
are threatened. 
 
The premise of the Aspen rule is that the dominant firm is able 
to undermine settled and investment-backed expectations reasonably 
derived from a joint investment.  For this reason, an Antitrust Division 
brief suggesting that the Aspen rule applies only where the original 
arrangement between the parties is noncontractual seems precisely 
 
96Id., ¶772.  
97Aspen, 472 U.S.  at 611 n. 44. 
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wrong.98  While an enforceable contract may not be essential, there 
must be enough of a commitment to guide the parties’ future 
investment decisions.  If liability were to be relaxed on this issue it 
would be where the injured firm’s reliance on settled expectations is 
not justified, perhaps because they initial agreement was incompletely 
specified or else where the firm based its investments on an unjustified 
understanding about the other firm’s commitments.  That is, the more 
certain and enforceable the initial agreement among the parties, the 
more the defendant’s subsequent repudiation is likely to upset settled 
expectations. 
 
Aspen has also been cited for the proposition that some kind of 
“sacrifice” is essential to liability.  In Aspen itself, the facts indicated 
that, while the joint venture was apparently profitable, its termination 
led to the plaintiff’s decline.99  While the Aspen opinion appeared not 
to require a “sacrifice,” it did observe that the defendant “was willing 
to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for 
a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival.”100  One problem with 
such a test is that it fails to distinguish ordinary investment that 
involve costs up front and payoffs later.101  A firm that builds a new 
plant knows that costs will come first, and gains only after the plant 
goes into production.  If it also knows that the firm’s production will 
injure a rival, does that mean we should condemn it as exclusionary? 
 
In any event, whether or not Aspen requires some conception 
of “sacrifice,” the facts of Qualcomm clearly met it.  By refusing to 
license to competitors Qualcomm gave up short term licensing 
revenue from these firms, and this sacrifice was profitable only to the 
extent that it served to injure or exclude these competitors.  Very 
 
98United States’ Statement of Interest Concerning Qualcomm’s 
Motion for Partial Stay of Injunction Pending Appeal, FTC v. 
Qualcomm (Case 19-16122, July 16, 2019), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1183936/ 
99Aspen, 472 U.S. at 608. 
100 Id. at 610-611. 
101 See Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1079-1080 
(10th Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch, Circuit Judge) (wrestling with this 
ambiguity). 
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largely the same thing can be said of its exclusionary discount 
campaigns involving firms such as Apple.  It paid Apple significant 
rebates in exchange for a promise not to deal with Qualcomm’s 
product market competitors.102 
 
The essential facility doctrine is different, and the Trinko case 
was more consistent with its principles.103 The Telecommunications 
Act at issue in Trinko permitted competitive exchange carriers to 
interconnect with the dominant firm’s facility no matter how small 
their investment in infrastructure.104  This was also true of the Otter 
Tail Power case, which interpreted antitrust law to require the 
defendant to “wheel” power for small utilities, whether or not they had 
their own generation capacity.105  In contrast to Trinko, the Court 
found antitrust liability in Otter Tail.  The important difference was 
that in the former case the then existing Federal Power Commission 
lacked the authority to compel wheeling of power in behalf of 
competing utilities.106  Wheeling power for utilities that lacked their 
own generation capacity was a close equivalent to interconnection in 
the phone system.  By contrast, in Trinko the relevant government 
agencies not only had the power to compel interconnection, the FCC 
had actually exercised that power in this very case.107 
 
 Aspen, in contrast to essential facility cases, was rooted in 
specific prior cooperation and investment by the plaintiff, reliance and 
path dependence, and subsequent repudiation.  The Court held 
essentially that once the defendant had made a commitment to its rival 
 
102 FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 2019 WL 2206013 (N.D.Cal. May 21, 
2019), at *55. 
103Verizon Communic., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 
540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
104See discussion supra text at notes __. 
105Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
106Id. at 375-376.  Subsequent statutory amendments have authorized 
FERC, the FPA’s successor agency, to compel wheeling.  See 16 
U.S.C. §824a-3.  See Nicholas W. Fels & David N. Heap, Compulsory 
Wheeling of Electric Power to Industrial Consumers, 52 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 219 (1983). 
107See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
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to develop a joint enterprise, it could not abandon that enterprise 
without an adequate business justification in those situations where 
the change in practice injured competition.108 
 
Not only is the Aspen approach to unilateral dealing 
obligations easier to justify as an abstract proposition, it also contains 
inherent limitations that make it more manageable by an antitrust 
tribunal.  As Trinko illustrates, the essential facility doctrine naturally 
invites questions about the scope of the property right that must be 
shared and the identification of those to whom the sharing obligation 
runs – both issues that are much better addressed by a regulatory 
agency applying an appropriate statute.  By contrast, the Aspen duty 
to deal involves a specific voluntary commitment between specific 
parties and under stipulated terms that can be expected to produce 
reliance that results in redirection of investment. 
 
Joint enterprises such as FRAND produce path dependence 
when they redirect the parties’ investments in ways that are costly to 
change.109  That is, the value of the firm becomes a function of its prior 
choices.110  This is particularly true of networks, where the ability to 
operate on the network is often essential to a firm’s survival.  In Aspen 
the Supreme Court required that the dominant firm’s subsequent 
withdraw from its contractual commitment be without an adequate 
business justification.111  Not every joint enterprise is successful, and 
the law should not require a firm to continue in a venture that is no 
longer economically justified.  At the same time, however, when it is 
 
108Id. at 608-609 (“…strongly supported by Ski Co.’s failure to offer 
any efficiency justification whatever for its pattern of conduct.” 
109The large literature on the subject includes OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, 
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, 
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 2 (1985); Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation 
and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426, 439-41 (1976); 
Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and 
the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978). 
110 See Cotter, Hovenkamp, and Siebrasse, supra note __ [TAN 75-
76] 
111Aspen, 472 U.S. at 608-610, which includes a lengthy recitation of 
the defendant’s proffered justifications and why the Court found them 
unacceptable. 
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clear that one party is undermining the other party’s investment-
specific transactions in a way that is conducive to reduced output and 
higher prices, antitrust intervention is appropriate. 
 
Antitrust intervention also requires evidence that the refusal to 
continue an agreed upon course of conduct harms competition, and 
that intervention will make the market perform more competitively.  
One reason this might not be the case is that the market is competitive 
in any event.  This is often true in bilateral monopoly situations in 
competitive markets.  For example, two farmers might jointly develop 
an irrigation pond at great expense, and one might later withdraw, 
leaving the other in financial distress. The market remains 
competitive, however, even if the breakup ruins one of the two 
farmers.  While the withdrawal might be a breach of contract or a tort, 
it would not violate the antitrust laws. 
 
Another possibility is that the joint venture was simply an 
excuse for price fixing.  For example, if the all-Aspen joint lift ticket 
was simply a way of setting the cartel price for downhill skiing in 
Aspen, then a breakup could well make the market perform better.  The 
dangers of collusion in the Aspen case were certainly greater than the 
dangers of collusion in a FRAND case involving a large number of 
participants and differentiated output.112  As the Allied Tube case 
suggests, however, collusion among standard setters cannot entirely 
be ruled out.  In that case members of a large SSO with a substantial 
investment in the manufacturing of steel conduit collusively passed a 
rule outlawing PVC conduit, which threatened to be a major market 
disrupter.113 
 
A FRAND obligation indicates that the patentee has made a 
prior voluntary commitment to share its technology on FRAND terms.  
In exchange it expects that others would rely on that commitment, 
designing their own technology around the expectation that FRAND-
encumbered patents would be available to them for a FRAND royalty.  
The market shapes itself around the technologies contemplated by 
 
112See note __, supra, noting the government investigation into price-
fixing.  Aspen, 472 U.S. at 591 n. 9. 
113Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 
(1988). 
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standard essential patents.  Indeed, that is the entire point of the SSO, 
and also serves to explain why a firm’s later, unjustified withdrawal 
can damage competition. 
 
The Aspen case certainly assumed some of this, although the 
case did not arise in the standard-setting context and the market as 
defined contained only two firms.  Once the parties agreed on a joint 
marketing scheme, they adjusted their promotional efforts around that 
scheme.  At the same time, it appears that the plaintiff did not redesign 
significant infrastructure around the joint venture.  One fact that places 
Aspen near the outer boundaries of antitrust liability is that the Court 
permitted the jury to find a violation even though the amount of 
dedicated investment that Aspen lost when the skiing venture fall apart 
was relatively modest.  Mainly, the two firms had agreed with each 
other to market an “All-Aspen” lift ticket jointly.  They apparently did 
not redirect significant investment into infrastructure that would have 
been useless had the venture collapsed. 
 
 Aspen limited its reach to situations where the defendant had 
voluntarily cooperated with a rival in some setting and later reneged 
without an adequate explanation.  In her Qualcomm decision, Judge 
Koh described a similar situation.  Qualcomm or its predecessors 
voluntarily made FRAND commitments on its patents and then 
reneged on those commitments in various ways.114  Aspen’s limitation 
to repudiation of established arrangements speaks to the role of 
technological path dependence in the creation or maintenance of 
dominance.115  For example, perhaps in addition to the technology 
subjected to FRAND there was an alternative unpatented technology, 
which was cheaper but somewhat inferior.  The developer is induced 
by the FRAND commitment to develop around the patented 
technology, but it is later withdrawn. 
 
 Whatever one might think of an essential facility doctrine as a 
tool of antitrust rather than regulatory policy, the Aspen case rests on 
 
114FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 2019 WL 220613 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 
2019), *83 (“Qualcomm Terminated a Voluntary and Profitable 
Course of Dealing”). 
115On this point, see Cotter, Hovenkamp, & Siebrasse, supra note __. 
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solid ground in situations that involve significant joint investments 
and path dependence.  Joint ventures enable firms to combine 
complementary technologies or business models and thus facilitate 
growth.  This has been true of some very prominent ventures, such as 
the GM-Toyota venture to design a single small car for production,116 
the joint venture between Kodak and GE to develop an electronic flash 
device for cameras,117 or the venture between Sony and N.V. Philips 
to develop technology for rewritable compact discs.118  Many joint 
ventures involve a significant sunk investment in assets that are 
dedicated to the venture.  If one firm can later extract itself and 
commandeer the relevant technology, it can leave the remaining firms 
at a significant competitive disadvantage, with the effect of 
transferring market share, reducing output, and raising prices.  In cases 
where interoperability is essential, it can exclude some firms from the 
network entirely. 
 
The EU Microsoft server decision illustrates some of these 
propositions.119  That decision also indicates the importance of path 
dependence in the maintenance of monopoly power, particularly in 
areas where technical compatibility is critical to the enterprise. 
Initially, Microsoft made its Windows operating system for desktop 
and laptop computers with active operators.  It did not develop an 
operating system for servers, which are computers that are largely 
untended and that perform routine functions such as managing email 
or web traffic.  Other firms, including Novell, developed operating 
systems for servers that were designed to operate on the networks of 
Windows machines.  For these, Microsoft provided protocols essential 
 
116See in re General Motors Corp., 103 FTC 58 (1984).  On 
competitive effects, see Kathryn M. Fenton, GM/Toyota: Twenty 
Years Later, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1013 (2005). 
117See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F.Supp. 404, 
419 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d 
Cir. 1979). 
118See Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
119Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. II-
3601.   See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, 
78 ANTITRUST L.J. 67 (2012). 
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to keeping these firms abreast of updates in the Windows operating 
system. Later, however, Microsoft entered the server operating system 
business itself in competition with these licensees.  At that point it 
began to degrade or delay the information that it provided to the 
competing sellers of server systems.120  The effect was to make these 
competing systems less reliable.  As a remedy, the EU tribunal 
required Microsoft to provide updated and adequate protocols.121  
Liability, as in Aspen, lay in a course of conduct, not in any finding 
that the Microsoft OS was an essential facility. 
A compulsory dealing order is justified only if it creates a 
reasonable expectation that the market will become more competitive 
– that is, that output will be higher and prices lower than if relief were 
not provided.  One common criticism of the “essential facility” 
doctrine, which Aspen did not involve, is that if a tribunal simply 
orders a dominant firm to share an asset the firm is likely to respond 
by setting its monopoly price.122  As a result, output will not increase 
under dealing.  The dealing order may benefit the rival who can now 
purchase the input, but customers will be no better off.  Real relief that 
increases competition requires both recognition of a duty to deal and 
setting of the price. 
 
In situations involving standard essential patents, these 
problems are largely addressed by the FRAND commitment itself, 
which includes a promise to submit the royalty question to an 
independent decision maker.123  The antitrust tribunal may also issue 
an injunction interpreting the scope of the FRAND commitment, 
requiring arbitration with respect to every potential licensee who is 
covered.  To the extent that the challenged FRAND violation results 
in less participation, lower production or higher prices than a FRAND 
tribunal would have permitted, antitrust relief should bring output and 
price into line. 
 
120See id., ¶575. 
121Id., ¶1231 (“Microsoft is … required to ensure that the 
interoperability information disclosed is kept updated on an ongoing 
basis and in a timely manner”). 
122See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note __, ¶¶773c., 774b. 
123See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
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Antitrust dealing orders are well suited to remedy one of the 
practices at issue in the Qualcomm case – namely that the defendant 
selectively refused to deal with or discriminated against prospective 
FRAND-qualified licensees depending on whether they competed 
with Qualcomm in the product market.124  The FRAND violation is 
clear without further market analysis to the extent that the FRAND 
obligation demands nondiscriminatory licensing to all parties 
practicing on the standard.125 
 
A refusal to deal with competitors additionally violates the 
antitrust rule of reason only if it produces the requisite anticompetitive 
effects.  Once again, that presents a fact question, and not every refusal 
to license in violation of a FRAND commitment will be an antitrust 
violation.  A violation would occur if, for example, the defendant’s 
selective denial of standard essential patents to market rivals serves to 
impede their growth, raises their costs, or perhaps exclude them from 
the market altogether.  All of these concerns are conventional in the 
antitrust law of exclusive dealing and quasi-exclusive dealing.126  
Indeed, evading a FRAND requirement by licensing selectively only 
to noncompetitors threatens to undermine the entire competitive 
purpose of the joint venture.  The purpose of standard setting is to 
design a standard so that goods can be produced competitively within 
a shared technology. 
 
Antitrust also has a role to play in the case of tying or similar 
practices.  To the extent the owner of a FRAND-encumbered patent 
licenses only on the condition that the implementer also purchases its 
hardware or other products or services, the firm undoubtedly is in 
breach of its FRAND commitments.  Whether it also commits an 
antitrust violation depends on power and competitive effects. As noted 
 
124See FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 2019 WL 2206013, *85 et seq 
(N.D.Cal. May 21, 2019) (discussing Qualcomm’s exclusive dealing). 
125E.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
126See 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶1821 (4th ed. 
2018). 
 
2019 FRAND And Antitrust 37 
previously,127 tying a product to a FRAND-encumbered patent can be 
a way of FRAND royalty avoidance: the seller simply obtains an 
effectively higher price for the patent by attaching the increment to the 
product.  Tying in order to evade a controlled price harms consumers 
by “extraction” rather than excluding.  As such it would be reachable 
under §1 of the Sherman Act if it results in higher prices.  A Sherman 
Act §2 violation would require a showing of market exclusion, most 
generally in the market occupied by tied product rivals.128 
 
B.  Collateral Issues Affecting Application of the Antitrust Laws 
 
1. “Regulatory” Deference? 
 
One common theme in antitrust cases involving regulated 
industries is that the role of the antitrust laws must be fashioned so as 
not to interfere excessively with the regulatory regime.129  The 
doctrine of “implied immunity” expresses how the courts have given 
effect to that concern.130  In Trinko the Court concluded that immunity 
did not apply because the 1996 Telecommunications Act contained an 
antitrust “saving” clause that preserved antitrust liability for disputes 
that were also covered by the Telecommunicatons Act.131  
Nevertheless the Court declined to find liability, reasoning essentially 
that the regulatory agencies were performing the antitrust function.132 
 
Saving Clause issues aside, implied immunity is a narrowly 
construed doctrine that serves to immunize conduct where a 
regulatory agency has jurisdiction over it and has been actively 
 
127See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
128See 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶¶1728-1729 (4th ed., 2016). 
129See 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶¶243-245 (4th ed. 2014). 
130 See id., ¶243d,e. 
131See 47 U.S.C. §152 “nothing in this Act … shall be construed to 
modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust 
laws.” See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 406-407. 
132See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
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involved in regulating it.133  Because federal agencies are staffed by 
professional government employees, their control is public.  The 
antitrust “state action” doctrine operates to create an analogous 
immunity for conduct that has been regulated by state law, 
immunizing private acts only when they are clearly authorized by state 
law134 and actively supervised by the state itself.135  As a result, private 
market participants cannot be the final word in supervision.136 
 
FRAND is not a government regulatory regime at all, but a set 
of private rules created and supervised by a joint venture of interested 
market participants.  Should a set of purely private rules serve to 
immunize conduct that is addressed under the antitrust laws but that 
may also be a violation of private rule making?  Of course, there could 
be issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, in an appropriate situation 
involving both a FRAND contract dispute and an antitrust dispute.  
For example, a finding in a FRAND case that the licensing agreement 
was not violated, or that a patent in question was invalid, could be 
preclusive on some facts in subsequent litigation involving the same 
party under the antitrust laws or any other body of law.137  Aside from 
that, no principle calls for antitrust deference to a private contractual 
regime. 
 
One objection to finding an antitrust violation when the 
defendant’s conduct has also violated its FRAND obligation is that 
this threatens a form of double liability, once for breach of the 
agreement and a second time for the antitrust violation.  There is little 
basis in fact or law for this concern.  Many federal antitrust violations 
are also breaches of contract, torts, or violations of some other body 
of law, including state antitrust law.  The remedy in these cases is not 
to dismiss one or the other claim at the onset, but rather to avoid 
 
1331A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note __, ¶243e. 
1341A Id., ¶¶224, 225. 
135 Id., ¶¶226, 227. 
136See, e.g., North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 
135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). 
137 E.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Fdn., 402 U.S. 
313 (1971); Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alp South, LLC, 735 F.3d 
1333 (Fed. Cir 2013). 
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double counting of damages for the same harm.  For example, if 
conduct is found to be both a violation of a federal statute and of a 
state common law contract rule, the damages remedy will include all 
elements available under each provision, but those that are duplicated 
must be remitted so that a plaintiff can collect only once for the same 
injury.138  As a result, one cannot avoid an antitrust claim by showing 
that the conduct in question is also a breach of contract.139 
 
One obvious difference between contract and antitrust 
damages is that the antitrust violation permits recovery of treble 
damages plus attorney fees, while breach of the FRAND agreement 
does not.  In that case the appropriate outcome would be the antitrust 
 
138See, e.g., Martinez v. The Port Authority of New York and New 
Jersey, 445 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2006) (to the extent claims of malicious 
prosecution and false arrest produced the same injury lower court was 
correct not to permit recovery for both); Mailman’s Steam Carpet 
Cleaning Corp. v. Lizotte, 415 Mass. 865, 870 (1993) (plaintiff who 
prevailed under both theories of breach of warranty and 
misrepresentation could have a single recovery for its injury);  Martin 
v. Jones, 41 N.E.3d 123, 143 (Ohio App. 2015) (while plaintiff 
prevailed on both a breach of contract theory and a tort theory for the 
same injury, he would be permitted to recover only the amount of his 
actual injury); Weathers v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 793 
F.Supp. 1002 (D. Kn. 1992) (plaintiff who brings claim on two 
different tort theory is entitled to only single compensatory damages).  
See also Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc. v. Pilla, 632 S.W.2d 
300 (Mo. App. 1982) (where plaintiff prevailed on both a fraud claim 
and a breach of contract claim and recovered precisely the same 
amount of damages for each of the two claims, the award effectively 
gave the plaintiff impermissible double damages). 
139See, e.g., Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 
218 (9th Cir. 1992)  (where both antitrust claims and common law tort 
and contract claims were predicated on the same loss of future profits, 
plaintiff must be limited to a single recovery; “Thus the district court 
may appropriately award a single compensatory damage figure, which 
might, upon retrial represent the jury award arising from the breach of 
contract claim, compensatory tort damages, or the antitrust damages 
prior to trebling.”). 
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treble damages award but not an additional monetary award for breach 
of the FRAND obligation. 
 
Injunctions generally do not present a problem of duplicative 
recovery as long as the scope of the injunction is the same for both 
causes of action.  If a particular injury results from both breach of a 
FRAND agreement and an antitrust violation, the likely remedy is an 
injunction under either or both provisions for harm that is threatened 
to recur, and a single set of damages for any past losses. 
 
2.  Holding Up vs. Holding Out: Antitrust Liability? And for 
whom? 
 
The familiar holdup story in patenting is that a patentee can 
strategically time its infringement suit in order to maximize the 
penalty it can extract from an infringer.140  For example, if an infringer 
has made a $100,000,000 largely irreversible commitment to a 
particular technology it will be willing to pay any anything up to that 
amount in order to obtain a license.141  The impact of the holdup 
literature has been significant and has undoubtedly influenced such 
 
140See Cotter, Hovenkamp, & Siebrasse, supra note __. 
141 See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 300 
(3d Cir. 2007): 
[A standard-setting organization] may complete its lengthy 
process of evaluating technologies and adopting a new 
standard, only to discover that certain technologies essential to 
implementing the standard are patented. When this occurs, 
the patent holder is in a position to “hold up” industry 
participants from implementing the standard. Industry 
participants who have invested significant resources 
developing products and technologies that conform to the 
standard will find it prohibitively expensive to abandon their 
investment and switch to another standard. They will have 
become “locked in” to the standard. In this unique position of 
bargaining power, the patent holder may be able to extract 
supracompetitive royalties from the industry participants. 
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decisions as eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC,142 which took away 
the more-or-less automatic right to an injunction for patent 
infringement.  The twin requirements of the SEP process can be 
viewed as addressing holdup by, first, requiring participants to provide 
timely notice of any IP rights that they plan to assert; and second, 
committing in advance to license their rights on a FRAND basis. 
 
An alternative account of the process is that what is really 
occurring is “holding out” by standard implementers at the expense of 
inventors.  In this account the implementers understand that only one 
among alternative technologies will be chosen, and they agree either 
to exclude a particular technology altogether, or else conditionally 
approve a particular technology in exchange for a below market 
royalty.143 
 
Currently there is very little empirical support for the holding 
out explanation in the context of standard essential patents.  The 
holding out theory also contains some important analytic and 
economic gaps.  In the hold out scenario a cartel of purchasers refuses 
to buy from the owner of a SEP unless the owner reduces its price to 
meet their terms.  Under FRAND, however, a royalty has not yet been 
determined when the FRAND commitment is made.  Further, when 
the royalty is determined it is generally by a neutral third party such 
as a federal court or arbitrator, and in an adversarial proceeding. This 
leaves little basis for thinking that implementers are concertedly 
boycotting innovators in order to reduce their royalties to below 
market values.  The holding out theory would additionally require 
some basis for thinking that FRAND royalty tribunals systematically 
undercompensate the owners of SEPS. 
 
The fact of persistent overclaiming of SEP status also seems 
inconsistent with the holdout theory, which is that the standard setters 
are operating as a buyers’ cartel in order to suppress royalties. 144  Buy-
side cartels, just as sellers’ cartels, succeed by suppressing output, and 
the targets naturally respond by trying to avoid the cartel.  For 
 
142 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
143See Cotter, Hovenkamp, & Siebrasse, supra note __. 
144On the extent of overclaiming, see discussion supra, text at notes 
__. 
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example, on the sell side, customers can be expected to resist a cartel 
of apple growers by switching from apples to pears.  If there were a 
buyers’ cartel of SEP patents, one would expect to see inventors 
attempting to avoid the cartel by declaring fewer of their patents to be 
standard essential.  That way they could behave in the same way as 
patentees generally, either by licensing or else by suing a suspected 
infringer for damages or an injunction through the federal judicial 
system. 
 
To put it differently, if the FRAND process is primarily a 
mechanism for suppressing patent royalties to below market levels, 
why do patentees persistently attempt to get patents declared as 
standard essential when in fact they are not?  One would expect the 
opposite phenomenon, of patentees avoiding SEP status in order to be 
able freely to assert their own royalty demands. 
 
Of course, participating members in SSOs are typically 
required by their membership agreements to declare patents that are 
reasonably thought to write on the standard.145  But that hardly 
explains the extensive overclaiming that is in fact occurring.  In the 
great majority of cases, it appears, it is more lucrative to claim and be 
included in the patent pool rather than subject one’s patents to ordinary 
judicial testing via infringement suits. 
 
One important difference between a buyers’ cartel and 
efficient joint purchasing is that the latter is an output-increasing 
rather than output-reducing strategy.146  The FRAND process does not 
bear the hallmarks of a buyers’ cartel.  Rather it is more consistent 
with the theory that generally supports FRAND in the first place.  
Namely, at an early stage when the future of a patent is uncertain and 
there are alternative technological paths to a standard, it is in a 
patentee’s interest to have SEP status.  Later, however, when 
development of technology under the standard has made that patent 
much more valuable, the SEP patentee would naturally prefer to be 
released from its FRAND obligations. 
 
145See discussion supra, text at notes ___. 
146See 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶2011 (4th ed. 
2019) 
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Any serious evaluation of holding up vs. holding out as 
explanatory alternatives can be made only upon considering the 
impact of search costs, which in the case of patented information 
technologies are formidable.147  High search costs explain why most 
SSOs require participants to make timely disclosure of IP rights.  If 
they are not voluntarily disclosed the parties would be unlikely to find 
them on their own.  Patent “ambush” refers to situations in which SSO 
participants are not forthcoming about their patents or patent 
applications.  They lie in wait until after the SSO has adopted a 
standard, and then announce the patent.  They will include a demand 
for very high royalties, limited by the sunk costs of the infringers.148  
By contrast, the holding out thesis is directed at known 
technologies.149 The idea is that manufacturers or other implementers 
band together to condition their adoption of a particular patent or 
patents on the patent owner’s willingness to accept a lower royalty or 
other unfavorable terms. 
 
Finally, the holdout theory encounters the legal obstacle that 
patent infringement actions remain available in the event of 
infringement.  Under the theory, implementers supposedly band 
together and force a patentee (through the process of SEP choice) to 
agree to sub-market royalties in exchange for selection of its patents.  
The patentee, having no alternative, agrees.  But a patentee who 
chooses not to participate has a damage action for patent infringement 
against implementers who use its invention without a license.150  
Further, this would likely be an action for willful infringement, 
 
147See Herbert Hovenkamp, Notice and Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. 
L.REV. ONLINE 221 (2011). 
148See Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and 
Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L.1151, 1179-80 (2009).  See the 
discussion of the Rambus decision, infra note __. 
149 E.g., TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., 899 F.Supp.2d 
356 (E.D.Pa. 2012) (sustaining complaint that defendant members of 
SSO agree with one another to exclude plaintiff’s proffered 
technology). 
150See Cotter, Hovenkamp, & Siebrasse, supra note __ [TAN 114-
116] 
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leading to the possibility of multiple damages.151  To be sure, in 
winner take all patent races losers may go uncompensated, but that 
occurs only if implementers do not infringe their patents.152 
 
Most of the antitrust case law on standard setting and holdout 
involves disapproval of products or processes where patent coverage 
is not relevant.153  Typically, the members decide not to use the 
plaintiff’s product at all.  For example, an SSO may refuse to approve 
a firm’s plastic electrical conduit, hydraulic valve, or tail light.154  
Clearly these cases can rise to the level of an antitrust violation if the 
concerted exclusion is found to be anticompetitive.  This occurs 
mainly when those setting the standard are in competition with the 
plaintiff and stand to gain from exclusion of a superior or lower cost 
product.155 
 
151 On this point, see Jorge L. Contreras, Much Ado About Hold-up, 
2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 875, 895 (“simply willful patent infringement”); 
accord A. Douglas Melamed & Carl Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can 
Make FRAND Commitments More Effective, 127 YALE L.J. 2110, 
2120 (2018).  See also Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding 
Out, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2014), who notes 
that one source of holdout is implementer use of patent owned by 
those who lack the resources to enforce them.  On multiple damages 
for willful infringement, see Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 
S. Ct. 1923 (2016)   
152See Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266 (5th 
Cir. 2008) (rejecting claim of patentee whose technology was not 
chosen).  See HOVENKAMP, ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note __, 
§35.02D. 
153The many and great variety of cases are discussed in 13 HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶2231-2232 (4th ed. 2019). 
154 E.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 
492 (1988) (SSO’s disapproval of plaintiff’s conduit); Hydrolevel 
Corp. v. American Society of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) 
(SSO’s disapproval of plaintiff’s valve).  See also Moore v. Boating 
Indus. Assns., 819 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 854 
(1987) (SSO’s disapproval of boat trailer tail light).  
155See 13 HOVENKAMP, supra note __, ¶2232.  Cf., Moore, id. (no 
antitrust liability where SSO of boat trailer manufacturers were 
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The theory of holding out may be called upon to explain a 
refusal by implementers to pay royalties to a particular patentee, or 
else to pay too low a royalty.  Given the costs of patent infringement 
when it is found, a more likely explanation is serious doubts about 
patent validity or infringement. Patents in information technology 
markets – including standard-essential patents in networked industries 
involving electronics and telecommunications – are rife with these 
problems.  In fact, patent infringement plaintiffs lose most cases, 
including those involving SEPs.  Refusing to accept and pay for a 
license on an untested patent is not an abuse of the system.  Rather, it 
is simply recognition of the fact there is a good chance that the patent 
that is being asserted is either invalid or not infringed.156   
 
In any event, the holding up vs. holding out debate is of limited 
significance to the general antitrust question, although it could be 
relevant in clear cases, such as those involving an implementers’ 
boycott of a known technology.  For example, an SSO may boycott a 
superior technology because it competes with technology already used 
by the implementers in the organization.  These were essentially the 
facts of the Allied Tube case, and have also been alleged in other 
cases.157  A concerted and anticompetitive refusal of a group of 
implementers to stay with or adopt an inferior technology, or to use 
the process to suppress royalties would be addressable under the 
 
purchasers of taillights, not competitors in production.  As a result, 
they could not benefit from exclusion of a superior light.). 
156 See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Our Divided Patent System, 82 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1099–1100, 1124– 26 (2015) (reporting an overall 
invalidation rate of 42.6% of all patents litigated to judgment).  See 
also Mark A. Lemley & Timothy Simcoe, How Essential Are 
Standard Essential Patents?, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 607 (2019) 
(although SEP patents are more likely to be held valid, they are less 
likely to be found to be infringed, indicating that they were not 
standard essential at all). 
157Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 
(1988).  See also Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 
266 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting claim that standard setting association 
conspired to remove plaintiff’s technology from standard). 
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antitrust laws, as it was in Allied Tube.  The antitrust violators in that 
case would be the implementers rather than the SEP holders.  
Importantly, however, Allied Tube did not involve a collective refusal 
to license the plaintiff’s patent.  Rather, it involved a collective refusal 
not to approve the plaintiff’s product at all and instead to limit the 
standard to an older technology (steel conduit).  If the defendants had 
decided to use the plaintiff’s technology without compensation, they 
would certainly have been liable for any patent infringement that 
occurred.158 
 
3. Rambus and Nondisclosure 
The Rambus decision, which involved patent ambush by 
nondisclosure,159 declined to find antitrust liability when the only 
proven injury was that implementers had to pay more money.160  
Rambus had failed to disclose some of its patents and patent 
applications to an SSO in which it was participating, and then later 
surprised implementers with them after they had made significant 
commitments.  The FTC assumed that the failures violated the SSO’s 
disclosure requirements, although it conceded that these requirements 
were “not a model of clarity,”161 did not clearly cover patent 
applications,162 and in one important vote did not even ask members 
to list their intellectual property holdings.163 The problem was not that 
Rambus had promised to license specific technology on specified 
terms, but rather that it withheld information about its patents, 
 
158The decision never discusses patents, and there was no reason for 
it, given the defendants’ decision not to approve or use the plaintiff’s 
product at all.  But cf. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 
297 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing Allied Tube in context of disclosure of 
IP rights in standard setting process). 
159 On SSO disclosure requirements, see discussion supra text at notes 
__. 
160Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  For further 
discussion, see HOVENKAMP, ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 
__, §35.05B; 
161Rambus, 522 F.3d at 461. 
162Ibid. 
163Id. at 469. 
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passively inducing implementers of the resulting standards to assume 
that the technology that they were adopting was in the public domain.  
Later, it surprised them by asserting infringement and demanding 
royalties. 
 
The D.C. Circuit declined to find liability because the record 
did not establish that the implementers would have adopted a 
different, nonproprietary standard had they known about Rambus’ 
intellectual property.164  As a result the conduct was deceptive but it 
was not shown to be exclusionary under the standards required by §2 
of the Sherman Act.165  It might have caused the implementers to pay 
more for technology that they had adopted, because now they had to 
pay Rambus’ royalty as well.  But absent evidence that they would 
have adopted different technology the mere obligation to pay more did 
not exclude.  As the court observed, “an otherwise lawful monopolist's 
use of deception simply to obtain higher prices normally has no 
particular tendency to exclude rivals and thus to diminish 
competition.”166  Rather, there must be some “effect on [the market’s] 
competitive structure.”167  It contrasted Conwood, another §2 case 
where the defendant’s deception had operated to shift market share 
away from plaintiff and toward the defendant.168  In that case, 
“misrepresentations to retailers about the sales strength of its [the 
defendant’s] products versus its competitors' strength” reduced 
competition in the monopolized market by increasing the display 
space devoted to U.S. Tobacco's products and decreasing that allotted 
to competing products.169 
 
164Id. at 463-464. 
165 Subsequent to Rambus the FTC itself has moved to exclusive use 
of §5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §45, instead of the Sherman Act.  See 
Maureen K. Ohlhausen, The Elusive Role of Competition in the 
Standard-Setting Antitrust Debate, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93 (2017).  
One important difference is that §5 of the FTC Act does not permit 
private damages actions. 
166Id. at 464. 
167 Id. at 466. 
168Ibid., discussing Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 
(6th Cir. 2002). 
169Id. at 464. 
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Rambus provides at least a partial rationale for distinguishing 
between a FRAND violation and an antitrust violation.  More 
significantly, it distinguishes the types of conduct necessary to violate 
§2 of the Sherman Act, in contrast to §1.  A firm’s unilateral failure to 
disclose technology can certainly be a violation of its SSO 
participation agreement, provided that the commitment is stated with 
sufficient clarity.  The remedy may be nonenforcement of the 
patent.170  It will not violate §2 of the Sherman Act, however, unless 
the behavior is also exclusionary.171  That is, §2 of the Sherman Act is 
not an appropriate vehicle for attacking conduct simply because it 
results in higher prices. That would be a case of extraction, but not 
obviously of exclusion.  Even under §2 standards, however, Rambus 
permits challenges to practices that result in actual suppression of the 
sales of competitors or their exclusion from a market.172 
 
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act is another matter.  The standard 
for illegality under §1, which applies only to multilateral conduct, is 
that it “restrain trade,” which means that the conduct tends to produce 
higher prices and thus lower output.173  Traditional ties and exclusive 
dealing are agreements in restraint of trade, although they are 
 
170See, e.g., Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (refusing to enforce patent that was not properly disclosed).  
Subsequent to Rambus many SSOs strengthened and clarified their 
disclosure requirements. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ET AL., 
IP/ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW §35.05 (3d ed. 2015 & 2019 Supp.); 
Nicos L. Tsilas, Toward Greater Clarity and Consistency in Patent 
Disclosure Policies in a Post-Rambus World, 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 
475 (2004). 
171See also  Townshend v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1011 
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (simple nondisclosure does not violate antitrust 
laws). 
172E.g., Actividentity Corp. v. Intercede Group, PLC, 2009 WL 
8674284 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 11, 2009) (distinguishing Rambus and 
finding a basis for antitrust violation when the failure to disclose did 
lead to market exclusion).   
17315 U.S.C. §1. 
 
2019 FRAND And Antitrust 49 
sometimes also treated as acts of monopolization when the structural 
requirements are met.174 
 
The ultimate concern of antitrust law is with conduct that 
reduces output and increases price.  Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
takes a conservative approach to unilateral conduct because of its 
concern to avoid regulating unilaterally set prices in the guise of 
antitrust enforcement.  Collaborative practices are generally not 
entitled to the same deference.  For example, price-fixing is unlawful 
even if the agreement does not exclude anyone.  Even under §1, 
however, the tendency in tying and exclusive dealing cases is to look 
for evidence that the higher prices was accompanied by suppression, 
or “foreclosure,” of at least one significant rival.  This is true of both 
tying and exclusive dealing under the rule of reason.175 
 
4.   Abuses of the Judicial Process 
Should the owner of FRAND encumbered patents be 
accountable under the antitrust laws for the way it employs judicial 
processes?  For example, suppose that the owner of a FRAND patent 
seeks an injunction against a manufacturer of a good that employs the 
patent and participates in the standard.  Patentees have a statutory right 
to obtain an injunction against proven infringers.176  As a result, 
seeking injunctive relief from a court should not ordinarily be an 
antitrust violation. 
Nevertheless, there are important qualifications.  If someone 
files a suit that no reasonable litigant would have brought with the 
 
174On the use of §2 to reach tying and exclusive dealing by monopolist, 
see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §7.6 (5th ed. 2015). 
175See, e.g., 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 
__, ¶1729 (tying under rule of reason).  However, under United States 
antitrust law tying can still be condemned under an idiosyncratic per 
se rule that does not require proof of foreclosure.  See id., ¶1720.  On 
exclusive dealing, see 11 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 
__, ¶1821 (noting relevance of foreclosure of competitors). 
17635 U.S.C. §283. 
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expectation of success, then antitrust liability can attach.  In such cases 
the litigation plaintiff’s expectation of success comes not from 
winning the lawsuit, but rather from depleting the defendant’s assets, 
delaying its market entry, or otherwise injuring it in ways unrelated to 
the outcome of the litigation. 
The grandparent of these cases is Walker Process Equip., Inc. 
v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.177 The patentee had a patent that it 
knew to be unenforceable under the statutory on sale bar,178 but it 
attempted to exclude a competitor from the market anyway via a 
patent infringement suit.  The Walker Process case applied the so-
called “sham” litigation exception that holds that the filing of a law 
suit loses its First Amendment protected status if the lawsuit is a 
“sham,” which means that it was filed without a realistic prospect of 
success from the litigation itself, but rather to intimidate, harass, or 
deplete the resources of the litigation defendant.179 
One important precondition to the sham litigation exception is 
that existing law be sufficiently “settled” that a lawsuit filed in conflict 
with it should be regarded as “objectively meritless.”180 That is, a 
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position should have known that 
the lawsuit would not succeed.  For example, if there is a conflict in 
the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal respecting a particular issue, a 
plaintiff should be entitled to convince the appellate courts to apply 
one interpretation rather than the other one.181  Issues of first 
 
177382 U.S. 172 (1965). 
178The on sale bar, 35 U.S.C. §102(a) & (b), makes a patent 
unenforceable if it was in public use of on sale more than one year 
prior to the filing date. 
179On antitrust liability for “sham” litigation, see 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA 
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶201-208 (4th ed. 2013). 
180E.g., Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures, 
Indus., Inc. 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993). 
181Id. at 65 (noting a Circuit split on the question whether charging 
money to show a movie in a hotel room was a “performance,” and thus 
copyright infringement; as a result, “Any reasonable copyright owner 
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impression or those that could reasonably come out either way can of 
course be the subject of litigation. 
There is no obvious reason that the sham litigation rule should 
not apply in the FRAND context, and under these same constraints.  
Once it has become a matter of settled law that a SEP owner is not 
entitled to an injunction under a given set of circumstances – that is, 
that a knowledgeable person would realize that there was no genuine 
prospect of relief --  then further lawsuits under those circumstances 
may give rise to antitrust liability.182  If the lawsuit is plainly in 
violation of an enforceable contract obligation, Walker Process 
liability should be appropriate.  On the other hand, if the issue remains 
open to legal doubt, then filing a lawsuit is appropriate, even if the suit 
is ultimately unsuccessful. 
Sham litigation establishes the conduct element of an antitrust 
offense.  In order to establish an antitrust violation, the challenger 
would still have to make out the other elements of an antitrust cause 
of action – namely, power and unreasonable exclusion for §2 cases, or 
a restraint of trade for §1 cases.183 
For example, once the FRAND obligation for a patent or set of 
patents has been established to require licensing to all implementers 
operating on the standard, a firm that files infringement lawsuits 
seeking injunctions against firms simply because they are product 
market competitors should generate the conduct basis for antitrust 
liability.  While this road to antitrust liability might seem narrow, it 
 
in Columbia’s position could have believed that it had some chance of 
winning an infringement suit”…). 
182See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1048 (9th Cir. 
2015) (approving jury conclusion that for a firm to seek injunctive 
relief on a FRAND-encumbered patent under the circumstances of 
that case did not enjoy antitrust immunity); Apple Corp. v. Motorola, 
Inc., 2012 WL 2276664, at *12 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2012) (similar). 
183See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶706a3 (4th ed. 2015). 
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becomes broader as litigation clarifies issues so that they can be 
regarded as settled. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 Among the various legal tools for policing the licensing 
process for standard essential patents, antitrust is only one, but it is an 
important one and has its own unique requirements and tools for 
analysis.  This hardly means, however, that the existence of FRAND 
obligations is irrelevant to antitrust claims.  Antitrust law takes 
markets as it finds them. For example, in the numerous antitrust 
decisions involving the NCAA,184 a very large joint venture, the 
antitrust courts do not pretend that the joint venture does not exist.  
Rather, they assume that the venture itself performs a socially valuable 
function.  Then they begin with its rules and the investments and 
commitments that its structure creates and considers how antitrust can 
be used to make the market function competitively on those 
assumptions. 
 
 FRAND is no different.  While it has its flaws, the standard 
setting process and the use of standard essential patents is well settled 
and assumed to be socially and economically beneficial.  In that case 
the best use of antitrust law is to police the competitive process within 
that system.  The FRAND system has its own rules and regulations 
and in the first instance enforcing them is not an antitrust function.  
But neither does the system create an antitrust immunity. 
 
 
 
184AMERICAN LAW REPORTS maintains a comprehensive list of the 
dozens of antitrust cases against the NCAA.  See Application of 
Federal Antitrust Laws to Collegiate Sports, 87 A.L.R. Fed.2d 43 
(2014, & updated weekly) 
